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KENTUCKYS NEW DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE LAW
The traditional conception of divorce based on fault has been
singled out particularly, both as an ineffective barrier to marriage
dissolution which is regularly overcome by perjury, thus promoting
disrespect for the law and its processes, and as an unfortunate
device which adds bitterness and hostility to divorce proceedings.'
For these reasons the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
[hereinafter cited as Uniform Act] .2 At the heart of this act is an
attempt to eliminate the introduction of evidence of marital miscon-
duct from all phases of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or
legal separation, including maintenance and property division.3 The
Kentucky dissolution law,4 publicly proclaimed the "no-fault divorce
law,"5 was modeled after the Uniform Act. This note will discuss the
new Kentucky act and compare it with the old divorce law. The Uni-
form Act, because of its similarity to the new law, will be a valuable
interpretative source and will be cited often.
I. DISSOLUmON OF MAunAGE
The Kentucky Dissolution Act, like the Uniform Act, attempts to
promote amicable settlements of marital disputes and mitigate re-
sultant harm to the spouses and their children by making irretrievable
breakdown the sole ground for marital dissolution.6 All traditional
grounds for divorce based on fault have been eliminated.7 The
rationale for a "no fault" concept of divorce is well explained in a
report of the Judiciary Committee of the California Legislature:
It is unrealistic to expect to eliminate all the acrimony built up
between the separating spouses, but by the elimination of the need
for pleading and proving "fault", there is reason to believe that the
procedures themselves will not add more divisiveness. By requiring
the consideration of the marriage as a whole and making the pos-
sibility of reconciliation the important issue, the intent is to induce
a conciliatory and uncharged atmosphere which will facilitate reso-
lution of the other issues and perhaps effect a reconciliation.8
1 NAT'L CONF. OF COM'RS ON UIFRvM STATE LAws, UNIoFM MARBIAGE
AND DrvoRcE AcT 177 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACT].
2id.
3 UNIFORM AcT 178.
4 Ky. Rxv. STAT. §§ 403.110-.350 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
5 The Courner-Journal and Times (Louisville), June 11, 1972, § G, at 12; The
Lexington Leader, June 10, 1972, at 3.
6 KRS § 403.110 (Supp. 1972).
7 KRS § 403.020 which enumerated grounds for divorce was repealed by Ky.
AcTs ch. 182, § 29 (1972).
8 CAL. Ass. REP. 8058.
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William L. Sullivan, the sponsor of the new act in the Kentucky
Senate, recognized the following considerations as leading to passage
of the new law: 9 (1) society does not benefit from holding unhappy
marriages together; (2) the name calling in divorces often resulted
from an attempt to get a more lucrative settlement rather than from
opposing the separation; (3) parties were forced into "truth-stretching"
in order to satisfy a legal fiction; and (4) absent a requirement of
proving fault, there is a better chance of reconciliation and less harm
is done to the children. Senator Sullivan implies that all instances of
fault should be eliminated; however, he admits he is unsure whether
fault is a factor to be considered in awarding maintenance. 0
A. Invalid Marriages
Kentucky Revised Statutes § 403.120 (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as KRS] provides that the judge "shall" declare a marriage
invalid if it was induced by force, fraud or duress. This section is
similar to KRS § 402.030 (which has not been repealed) except that
it grants the trial judge less discretion. Under KRS § 402.030, a
judge "may" declare the marriage invalid under the above circum-
stances. Although the legislature did not expressly repeal KRS §
402.030 the more recent enactment, KRS § 403.120, should govern.
Additional grounds upon which a court shall declare a marriage
invalid include mental incapacity to consent due to incapacitating
substances or a mental incapacity or deformity; inability to consummate
the marriage by sexual intercourse if the other party entered the
marriage without knowledge of this; or legal prohibition of the mar-
riage. This last ground is probably intended to apply to legal pro-
hibitions which include incestuous marriages (nearer than second
cousins)," bigamy, marriage with an idiot, marriages which have
not been solemnized in the presence of an authorized person, or mar-
riages where one party is under age.12 After the death of either party
a marriage can be declared invalid only where one party lacked
the capacity to consent at the time the marriage was solemnized, i.e.,
the "capacity to understand the nature of the contract and the duties
and responsibilities which it creates."' 3 A party or his legal repre-
sentative may seek a declaration of invalidity for lack of consent or
inability to consumate the marriage no later than 90 days after
obtaining knowledge of such condition. In the case of prohibited
9 Sullivan, The No-Fault Divorce Act, 36 Ky. B.J. 37 (July 1972).
10 Id. at 38.
11 KRS § 402.010.
1
2 KRS § 402.020.
'3 Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W.2d 900, 901-02 (Ky. 1951).
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marriages action must come within one year after obtaining knowledge.
Previous divorce parlance and procedures are now replaced by
terminology and procedures appropriate to dissolution of marriages. 14
Examples of the new terms are "In re the marriage of" rather than
"divorce," "petition" rather than "complaint," and a decree is no longer
"awarded to" either of the parties. Other new terms are "maintenance"
instead of "alimony" and "support" rather than "maintenance." These
new terms are designed to reduce the hostility inherent in marital
separations by removing the adversary concept from dissolution pro-
ceedings.' i
B. Procedure
Prior to entering a decree of dissolution or legal separation the
court must find: (1) that one party has an appropriate connection
with Kentucky; (2) that the marriage is irretrievably broken; and (3)
that custody, maintenance, support and property disposition have been
provided for.16 The new act requires that one party must have lived
in Kentucky for at least 180 days prior to commencement of the
action as opposed to one year under the old law.' 7 KRS § 403.025,
governing burdens of proof, has not been repealed; therefore, the
grounds for dissolution must be proven by one of the parties, and the
residency requirement must be proven by a supporting witness.
What constitutes an "irretrievably broken marriage" presents a dif-
ficult problem which will be discussed subsequently.
Either or both parties may petition for dissolution of marriage or
legal separation. The verified petition must allege the marriage is
irretrievably broken and include: the age, occupation, place and
length of residence of each party; the date of marriage and place of
registration; a recitation that the parties are separated and the date of
separation; the names, ages and addresses of any living infant children
of the marriage and a statement of whether the wife is pregnant (the
14 KRS § 403.130 (Supp. 1972).
15 The change from "fault" to "no-fault" basis dictates the use of terms
and of procedures different from those which have become thoroughly
associated with fault-orientation, in order to impress bench and bar with
the break from past concepts. UNIFORm AcT § 301, Comment.
16KRS § 403.140 (Supp. 1972).
In the recent case of Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals interpreted this provision to mean a decree of dis-
solution may be granted prior to a final disposition of the matters enumerated in
KRS § 403.140 (Supp. 1972). It held that this section only enumerates the con-
ditions under which a decree of dissolution shall be entered.
17 This action by the Kentucky legislature is not designed to encourage dis-
solution of marriages as the decreased residency requirement appears to indicate.
For example the Uniform Act has only a 90 day requirement and apparently the
Kentucky legislators feared this period might encourage "quickie' divorces so it
chose 180 days.
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court may continue the case until a pregnancy terminates); any ar-
rangements for custody, visitation and support of children and mainte-
nance of a spouse; and the relief sought.18 KRS § 452.470, the venue
statute, was not repealed, so the petition must include the usual
county of residence of the wife. Proper venue remains the residence
of the wife, but this can be waived.19
It is not necessary to reply to a petition, but the non-petitioning
party may file a verified response which can include only corrections of
misstatements in the petition, a denial that the marriage is irretrievably
broken, or a request for relief. Because the old grounds for divorce
and defenses thereto are abolished,20 the response requires, and allows,
nothing additional.
Either party may move with supporting affidavits, for temporary
maintenance or temporary support of a child conceived of the mar-
riage.21 Interestingly, a husband can now receive temporary mainte-
nance, whereas under the old law it was granted only to the wife.22
The court may also grant a temporary injunction or restraining
order on the motion of either party which will be terminated when
the final decree is entered. These temporary judgments do not affect
the rights of the parties at the subsequent hearings, 23 and any agree-
ment made thereunder will not be permanently binding.
Under the new law no decree can be entered until the parties
have lived apart for 60 days. If either party states by petition or
under oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken and
the other fails to deny it, the court, after hearing, shall find whether the
marriage is in fact so broken. It may order a conciliation conference
as part of the hearing. If a party denies the marriage is irretrievably
broken, the court must consider "all relevant factors" and determine
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken or continue the matter
for 30 to 60 days. The court may suggest counseling or order a con-
ciliation conference on its own or a party's motion. Irretrievable break-
down is defined as "no reasonable prospect of reconciliation." 24
C. Legal Separation
Legal separation, an alternative to dissolution of the marriage,2 5
must be granted on motion of either party unless the other objects.
18 KRS §403.150.
19 St. John v. St. John, 163 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1942).
20 Ky. AcTs ch. 182, § 29 (1972).
21 KRS § 403.160.
22 KRS § 403.055.
23 KRS § 403.160.
24 KRS 403.170.
25 KRS § 403.140.
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Although it is unclear from the statutory language what constitutes
'legal separation," it appears to involve the same concept as "divorce
from bed and board."26 Grounds for "divorce from bed and board"
are "any cause that allows divorce, or any other cause that the court
in its discretion considers sufficient." These grounds are broader than
the requirement that the marriage be irretrievably broken, the grounds
for legal separation,27 so a problem in statutory interpretation is
presented. Since the intent of the new dissolution law is to make
irretrievable breakdown the sole cause for dissolution or separation,
"divorce from bed and board," which may be granted by the court
for any reason at its discretion, may be impliedly repealed.
Possibly legal separation has the same effect as "divorce from bed
and board" on the relations between the spouses. "Divorce from bed
and board" operated as a divorce as to after-acquired property and the
personal rights and legal capacities of the parties, except that neither
could remarry. The spouses retained their dower, curtesy and dis-
tributive rights.28 Because the effect of a 'legal separation" is not
enumerated in the statute, the legislature may have intended that it
be equivalent to "divorce from bed and board" since the "bed and
board" statute was not repealed.
D. Separation Period
The 60 day separation period, if read literally, required that the
parties must not live together under the same roof for at least 60
days prior to entry of the decree. However, occupying separate bed-
rooms in the same house may constitute living apart, 29 although some
circuit courts (Fayette for example) have rejected this interpretation.
Even if the parties have been separated for 60 days, no testimony
except as to temporary motions shall be heard in cases involving
children until 60 days after service of summons or appointment of a
warning order attorney or the defendant has filed an entry of appear-
ance or responsive pleading.30
If "separation" means living under separate roofs, problems are
certain to arise. Perhaps the most obvious is the situation involving a
non-working wife with children. If her husband refuses to leave, she
would be forced to move because the husband cannot be ordered
out of the house unless the wife can swear she is in great fear of her
26 KRS § 403.050.
27 KRS § 403.140.
28 KRS § 403.050.
29 See Wax, Application of "No-Fault" Law, Louisvnix B. Ass'N NEws BULL.
1, 2 (June 1972).
30 KRS § 403.044.
[Vol. 61
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE LAW
life or has been beaten severely. The expense of maintaining a
separate residence for 60 days would be prohibitive to many women
unless they are allowed temporary maintenance. However, due to
the crowded dockets in most circuit courts, temporary maintenance
motions often take several weeks. Therefore, the better interpretation
of "separation" would allow the husband and wife to live in separate
bedrooms in the same house as the Court of Appeals recognized in
York v. York.31 As long as one of the parties refuses to recognize the
marriage relationship, they should be considered separated.
E. Default Procedure
When one spouse fails to appear at a proceeding for dissolution of
the marriage, there is a question as to default procedure. The California
"no-fault" divorce law, 32 which is similar to the Kentucky act, requires
the petitioner to appear and testify at the hearing unless there are
exceptional circumstances which are explained to the court.33 In
exceptional circumstances the trial court may permit petitioner's
affidavit or testimony of any competent witness, including the re-
spondent, to establish the requisite proof.
F. Conciliation Conferences
Rather than finding the marriage irretrievably broken, the court
may order a conciliation conference for the purpose of bringing the
parties together in an attempt to resolve their problems and preserve
the marriage.3 4 The question of whether the marriage is in fact
irretrievably broken can be determined at the conference.
A conciliation conference, provided for in the new act, seems to
be related to the advisory committee which was retained from the old
law. The court may appoint a committee to counsel the parties and
make recommendations to the court.35 However, since committee mem-
bers serve without salary or reimbursement for expenses, it is doubtful
that this device will be frequently used. Instead, the judge and the
parties will probably be the only ones present at the conference, and
few judges are trained marriage counselors. A possible solution to
this problem would be to require the parties to confer with a marriage
counselor at their own expense.
31280 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1955).
32 CAL.. CIv. CODE §§ 4000 et seq. (West 1970).
33 McKim V. McKim, 100 Cal. Rptr. 140, 493 P.2d 868 (1972).
3 4 Even if one p arty files a motion supported by an affidavit that the marriage
is not irretrievably broken the trial court may enter a dissolution decree without
ordering a conciliation conference. Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky.
1973).




Perhaps the most significant problem in applying the new act is
the determination of what constitutes an "irretrievably broken mar-
riage." The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws accept the New-
man v. Newman36 definition37 that there is "such a conflict of per-
sonalities as to destroy the legitimate ends of matrimony and the pos-
sibility of reconciliation."3 8 The act defines irretrievable breakdown as
"no reasonable prospect of reconciliation," but "reconciliation" is as
nebulous as "irretrievably broken."3 9 In a recent California decision
"reconciliation" was defined as follows:
a mutual manifestation of intention that the parties shall there-
after permanently live together as husband and wife accompanied
by a resumption by them of the intended status. The intention
must be unconditional . . . and must contemplate a complete
restoration of marital rights. Marital rights in this context include
not only cohabitation in the sexual sense but also those rights
pertinent to the companionate aspects of marriage and those per-
taining to marital property.
40
A single or isolated voluntary act of sexual intercourse is generally
insufficient to constitute reconciliation, although it may raise a pre-
sumption thereof.4 '
Because "irretrievable breakdown" is so vague, it provides no real
guidance for the parties, attorneys or judges. Judges have widely
divergent personal attitudes toward marriage and are essentially free
to impose their own standards. A comment in the Uniform Act sug-
gests how the "irretrievably broken" standard should be applied:
The legal assignment of blame is here replaced by a search for the
reality of the marital situation: whether the marriage has ended in
fact. The public policy embodied in this section was recognized in
DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 863-64, 250 P.2d 598, 601
36391 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1964).
3 7 UN FoR AcT § 302, Comment.38 Newman v. Newman, 391 P.2d 902, 903 (Okla. 1964).
39 The only Kentucky case defining "reconciliation," a will contest, states that
it "imparts a mental state rather than an active condition of association, and this
mental state is hard to establish except by the declarations of the parties in interest."
Alexander v. Page, 101 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Ky. 1907).4o Kelley v. Kelley, 77 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360, 272 Cal. App.2d 379, 380 (1969).
See also, e.g., Gutmann v. Gutmann, 175 A.2d 470, 474 (N.J. 1961):
"Reconciliation" in the context of the repair of a broken marriage, means
something more than mere resumption of cohabitation and the observance
of surface civility. It comprehends a fresh start and a genuine effort by
both parties to avoid the pitfalls which caused them to separate.
41 See 19 C.J.S. Divorce § 61 (1959). Contra, Stewart v. Stewart, 175 S.2d
692, 696 (La. 1965), which proclaimed intercourse "the extreme fulfillment of the
marital relationship," so a single voluntary performance of this act is conclusive
evidence of a reconciliation.
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(1952) (Traynor, J.): "when a marriage has failed and the family
has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of family life are no longer
served and divorce will be permitted."42
There may be a gap in the new provisions through which evidence
that would have previously been used to show fault can be intro-
duced. Relevant acts of marital misconduct the old grounds for
divorce based on fault,43 though repealed,44 may be used to show
irretrievable breakdown. One author asserts that "the marriage is
irretrievably broken" embraces all the traditional grounds for di-
vorce. 45 Perhaps if evidence of marital misconduct was to be excluded
the General Assembly would have specifically enacted the exclusion,
as California did in its "no-fault" divorce law.46 However, such an
interpretation would defeat the underlying purpose of the new Ken-
tucky act by reviving hostile adversary proceedings when one party
did not want the marriage dissolved.
In light of the general purposes of the new act, specific acts of
misconduct should be excluded whenever possible. The judge should
limit inquiry solely to the subjective state of mind of the parties, utiliz-
ing marriage counselors, psychiatrists, psychologists and others he
deems necessary to make a final determination as to whether the mar-
riage is irretrievably broken. If only the subjective state of mind of the
parties is considered, the judge will not be influenced in other judicial
determinations, such as child support and custody and property divi-
sion, by irrelevant acts of misconduct.
The effects of the separation period and compulsory counseling
are debatable. One author believes that separation often leads to
reconciliation rather than divorce.47 The spouses may find the separa-
tion painful and wish to live together again. Social pressures from
friends and relatives also tend to lead to reconciliation. Separation
may, at least temporarily, relieve severe conflicts. Another author
agrees that the separation period may be valuable but fears that com-
pulsory counseling will not be helpful because the parties will be
uncommitted to a reconciliation.48
4 2 UNiFoRm AcT § 305, Comment.
43 KRS § 403.020.
44 Ky. AcTs ch. 182, § 29 (1972).
45 Collyer, The Marriage is Irretrievably Broken, 45 FLA. B.J. 558, 560 (1971).
See generally Saul, Proof of a No-Fault Divorce Case, 45 L.A.B. BuLL. 99 (1970).4 6 CA1. Cnv. CODE § 4509 (West 1970) is a sweeping ban on introduction into
the pleadings or evidence specific acts of misconduct.
47 W. GOODE, AFrE= DrvORCE 173-74 (1956).4 8 Shankweiler, Statutory Marriage Counseling, 45 FLA. B.J. 566 (1971). Mr.
Shankweiler, a theologian and attorney, sincerely believes that rehabilitation of a
failing marriage:
cannot be effective unless it is voluntary. This writer has seen many ex-




The new act contains a provision allowing the parties to enter
into a written separation agreement to provide for maintenance of
either spouse; disposition of any property; and custody, support and
visitation of the children.49 The terms of this agreement, except as
they pertain to the children, are binding on the court unless the agree-
ment is found to be unconscionable, in which case the court can
request or order the parties to modify it. The separation agreement
must be incorporated verbatim or by reference into the decree unless
it provides otherwise in which case the decree must identify the
agreement and state that the terms are not unconscionable. Enforce-
ment of an agreement that is merely identified may be difficult. Since
it is not part of the decree, a violation will not constitute contempt,
and the only remedy will be in contract. If the separation agreement
is included in the decree all terms are enforceable by the court which
granted dissolution.
The parties may agree to preclude modification of any terms, except
those pertaining to the children. 0 However, absent agreement be-
tween the parties, the terms of the separation agreement are auto-
matically modified by modification of the decree.51 One way to
handle this problem is to insert a clause in the contract providing
that the agreement may be incorporated by reference, that each party
agrees to abide by its provisions, and that the agreement may be
enforced by the proper court. There should be a stipulation that only
those provisions dealing with children may be altered.
By encouraging amicable agreements as to financial arrangements
the new procedures should reduce the hostility generally accompanying
this issue. The public interest is best served by allowing the parties
to plan their own future.52 Further, the state will save financially if
these disputes can be resolved outside the courtroom.
When the parties enter a separation agreement, the primary judicial
function will be to determine whether it is unconscionable. The lead-
ing case defining "unconscionable" is Hume v. United States,53 which
declared an unconscionable bargain one ". . . such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
(Footnote continued from precedin, page)
amples of "negative result' counseling situations due to one or both of the
parties being uncommitted to the therapeutic process. Id. at 566.
u KRS § 403.180(1).
5oKRS § 403.180(6).
51 Id.
5 2 UmFoRm Acr § 306, Comment.
3 132 U.S. 406 (1889).
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no honest and fair man would accept, on the other... .'51 Although
primarily a commercial law term, unconscionable has been applied
in the family law area. In Bell v. Bell,55 the Colorado court used the
term to describe an unfair property settlement in a divorce action.
Apparently, an "unconscionable" agreement is one which the court
considers grossly unfair after consideration of all the facts of the
particular case. The trial judge is in the best position to know the
circumstances peculiar to the parties and the locale, and because he
is not bound by any strict legislative standard, he can exercise his own
discretion to achieve an equitable result. The trial court's function
here is to protect the party who has signed an inequitable agreement.
I. Property Division
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation the
court first assigns each spouse's property to its owner and then divides
the marital property, considering all relevant factors, without regard
to fault or misconduct. Contribution of each spouse must be con-
sidered, specifically including contribution as a homemaker. The
value of separate property already set aside to each spouse is im-
portant, as is the duration of the marriage. Another consideration is
the economic circumstances of each spouse, including the desirability
of the spouse with custody of the children to have the home.56
All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be
marital property regardless of title.57 However, this presumption is
rebuttable by showing that the property was (1) acquired by inher-
itance or gift, (2) acquired in exchange for non-marital property,
(3) acquired after the decree of legal separation, (4) excluded by a
valid agreement, or (5) natural increase or appreciation (not resulting
from the parties' efforts) in property obtained prior to the marriage.
One difference between the Kentucky act and the Uniform Act is
that Kentucky specifically exempts natural increases in property
acquired before the marriage from the marital property category.58
Disputes are certain to arise from the determination of whether the
increase in value results from the parties' efforts. For instance, the
value of real property acquired prior to the marriage may increase,
but if the owner benefits because he was persuaded by his spouse not
to sell, did the increase result from that party's efforts? Another
54 Id. at 411.
55 371 P.2d 773, 774 (Colo. 1962).
GO KRS § 403.190.
57 Id.
5 8 Compare UNIFoxm AcT § 307 with KRS § 403.190(2) (e).
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example occurs where, after a spouse inherits stock, a stock dividend
is declared with the option of receiving cash rather than stock, and
the cash is taken. Is this marital property? The Uniform Act did not
include the natural increase exemption probably because of such
inherent complications.
The new act, in KRS § 403.190, appears to codify Colley v. Colley59
which held that "fault is not a relevant consideration" in determining
the division of marital property.50 Division of marital property
should be determined by what is just and reasonable. The Court in
Colley validated the broad guidelines derived from three cases that
may still be good measurements in making this determination. Reed
v. Reed61 gave a wife-homemaker who contributed little to the business
something less than one-third of the jointly acquired property. Gold-
stein v. Goldstein62 awarded the wife one-half the jointly acquired
property where she had taken an active part in the business. Heustis
v. Heustis63 held that the wife is entitled to at least one-third of the
jointly acquired property even though she has not participated in the
business. These basic guidelines can be used by the courts in
determining whether a property division agreement is "unconscionable."
In determining whether an agreement is unconscionable or in arriving
at a judicially imposed settlement, contribution and need should both
be considered in dividing marital property. The need will be estab-
lished by the facts and circumstances of the particular case, while
contribution may be determined by reference to the cases discussed
above. Fault is not a factor to be considered, which helps resolve
marital separations in an amicable atmosphere with a minimum of
harm, the basic purpose of the act.
J. Maintenance
The new act authorizes the court to provide for maintenance in a
dissolution or legal separation proceeding and in a proceeding after
a dissolution proceeding in which the court could not award mainte-
nance because it lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse.
Maintenance may be granted to either spouse only if that party
lacks both sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs and
sufficient employment is either, unavailable or impractical because of
child rearing. In determining the amount of maintenance or how long
it should continue, all relevant factors should be considered, including
59 460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
60 Id. at 826.
61457 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1969).
62377 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1964).
63 346 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1961).
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the financial resources and ability to meet needs independently, the
amount of retraining necessary to obtain a job, the standard of living
and duration of the marriage, the condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance, and the hardship imposed on the burdened spouse.64
A notable omission in the new section dealing with maintenance is
the lack of a provision excluding considerations of marital misconduct.
The Uniform Act specifically excludes considerations of marital mis-
conduct,0 5 and this section of the Kentucky act was adopted verbatim
except for this omission. The original Senate Bill 133 contained the
exact wording of the Uniform Act, 6 but "without regard to marital
fault" was deleted by the House and subsequently agreed to by the
Senate. The logical conclusion is that the legislature intended that
fault be considered in awarding maintenance. Professor Petrilli be-
lieves that fault remains a relevant factor for three reasons:
(1) legislative history-original inclusion of the words and the ex-
clusion indicates an intent not to repeal existing law or fault;
(2) the words "without regard to marital fault" are in KRS §
403.190 (assigning marital property), and KRS § 403.210
(child support) which reinforces the view that if fault is
specifically eliminated in those sections it was not intended to
be eliminated in K.RS § 403.200;
(3) ". .. all relevant factors including," followed by a listing of
specific factors may by the usual process of statutory in-
terpretation indicate the listing is illustrative and not exclusive.
The listing would not exclude other relevant factors not
listed. Thus, fault may be included.
67
Assuming fault is to be a factor in the award of maintenance, at
what point should it be introduced? There seems to be a two part
process involved: initially, a determination must be made as to whether
there is a need for maintenance and, if so, the amount required. Pro-
fessor Petrilli has suggested that fault be considered only in de-
termining the amount awarded, not whether the need exists. 68
In a recent case, Chapman v. Chapman,69 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals determined that fault is not to be considered in determining
whether to award maintenance; however, it can be considered in
determining the amount. Maintenance is to be awarded if the court
64 KRS § 403.200.
65 Umurom Acr § 308.
062 S. JouR. 2077 (Reg. Sess. 1972).
67 R. PETrBLLI, Ky. FA2,rny L. 8 (Special No-Fault Divorce Supp. 1972).
68 Id. But see In re Williams, 199 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1972), where the Iowa
no-fault divorce' statute was construed to eliminate fault in maintenance de-
termination.
69 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973).
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makes two determinations: (1) the spouse lacks sufficient property
with which to support herself [himself]; and (2) she [he] is unable
to support herself [himself] through appropriate employment or is cus-
todian of a child which prevents employment. The amount to be
awarded is made after the court has initially determined that mainte-
nance is appropriate and it involves different considerations. Mainte-
nance is to be an amount the court determines is just after considering
all relevant factors: fault is a proper item to be considered in de-
termining the amount.
A primary purpose of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
was to decrease the use of maintenance in favor of property disposition
to provide for the financial needs of the parties.70 Kentucky courts
should encourage a lump sum settlement, for it is easier and less
expensive to administer than supervising maintenance. It may be
possible to get a lump sum maintenance from an increase in value of
property obtained before the marriage that would not be considered
marital property for purposes of property disposition. A general guide-
line expressed in Colley v. Colley7l for determining when maintenance
should be granted is that the estate is insufficient unless
... it will yield income or profits sufficient for her [his] comfortable
maintenance in a style suitable to the social standing established
by the parties during marriage without her [him] being required to
consume the principal.72
Either party can get maintenance. This situation has undoubtedly
arisen from the increased employment opportunities and the increased
participation of women in the labor force.73 Maintenance is losing
favor in divorces because the woman is frequently able to support
herself after the divorce.
K. Child Support
Either parent may be ordered by the court to pay child support
without regard to marital misconduct.74 All relevant factors are to be
considered including the child's needs and the financial resources of
the child and the custodial and noncustodial parent. The motion for
support must be accompanied by an affidavit detailing these factors.
The court can require a wage earner to pay a portion of his salary for
7o UNimop AcT § 308, Comment.
71460 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1970).
72 Id. at 827.
73 The overall labor-force participation of women increased from 25.7% in
1940 to 42% in 1969. Bernard, No News, but New Ideas, in DIvoRCE AND AFryR
5 (P. Bohannan ed. 1970).
74 KRS § 403.210.
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support, and an employer can be ordered to deduct support payments




The court may order either party to pay the attorney's fees and
costs of the other after considering the financial resources of both.76
Only financial considerations are relevant, because the statute requiring
the husband to pay all costs and attorney's fees unless the wife is at
fault and has an ample estate of her own 77 has been specifically re-
pealed.78 The concept of the husband not being required to pay the
attorney's fees of his wife if she is financially able to pay is not un-
precedented in Kentucky.79 "Costs" seems to impliedly include any
expenses incurred in court ordered conciliation conferences and the
use of specialists such as marriage counselors. Thus, the court has the
power to require the parties to do and pay for such things that it
believes can save the marriage.
M. Decrees
The court must convert a decree of legal separation to one of dis-
solution of marriage on the motion of either party at least one year
after entry of the decree. A childless wife shall have her former name
restored if she so moves.80
A party's legal obligations arising from the marital separation or
dissolution are unaffected by the other party's failure to comply with
his obligations.8 ' For example, if one party fails to comply with a
court order, the other must continue to make payments or do whatever
else he is obligated to do. This section was designed to abolish self-help
remedies82 where one party would attempt to force the other to comply
with his responsibilities by withholding compliance with his duties.
Hopefully, greater reliance on the court to enforce its decrees will
result from this section.
N. Modification of Decrees
Provisions of any decree, except those pertaining to support, custody
or visitation of children, may be modified only by showing that the
75 KRS § 405.035.
76 KRS 403.220.
77 Id.
78 Ky. AcTs ch. 182, § 29 (1972).
79 See Barnes v. Barnes, 458 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1970); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson,
335 S.W.2d 552 (Ky. 1960).
80 KRS § 403.230.
8s KRS § 403.240.
82 UNIFoRm AcT § 315, Comment.
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terms are unconscionable as a result of changed conditions. Property
disposition terms may be modified only by conditions justifying re-
opening of a judgment under the rules of civil procedure.8 3 Mainte-
nance obligations, unless agreed otherwise, terminate at the death of
either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.
On the other hand, child support obligations terminate only at the
child's emancipation, unless otherwise agreed.84 Therefore, circum-
stances will dictate whether maintenance or support is more desirable.
For instance, support may be preferable where the obligated party
is old or sick because at his death his estate will be bound to continue
payments. Maintenance may be preferable if the children are near
the age of emancipation when support would be terminated. Income
tax consequences will also normally be an important factor to consider
in deciding whether support or maintenance is most advantageous.
II. CHMu CUSTODY
New KRS § 403.260, pertaining to child custody, is copied almost
verbatim from Section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
[hereinafter cited as Uniform Custody Act].85 Presumably, the General
Assembly had the same goals as the drafters of this act in enacting
the legislation: (1) to avoid jurisdictional conflict among states which
in the past has resulted in shifting the child from state to state, and (2)
to "discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family
relationships for the child."8 6 This act is designed to protect the child
and foster his interests and should be read and interpreted with this
goal in mind.
A. Jurisdiction
A court competent in child custody matters has jurisdiction to make
a child custody determination if this state is either his home state
at the commencement of the action or had been his home within six
months prior to the commencement and a parent or person acting as
parent continues to live in this state. "Home state" is defined by the
Uniform Custody Act as the state where a child lived with his parents
83 KY. R. Cry. P. 60.02.
84 KRS § 403.250.
8 5 NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'nS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNrnr CMLD
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or persons acting as parents for at least six consecutive months im-
mediately preceding commencement of the action.
87
A court may also assume jurisdiction if it is in the child's best
interest when the child and at least one parent have a significant
connection with the state and substantial evidence concerning the
child may be found there. This situation may arise if the family
moves frequently. The "significant connection" depends on the
strength of the family ties and affords the trial court much discretion.
88
Even if a sufficient connection is present, the substantial evidence
requirement acts as a limitation on jurisdiction.
A court may also obtain jurisdiction if the child has been abandoned
and is physically present in the state or if an emergency arises in
which the child needs immediate protection. Only in extraordinary
circumstances should this provision be used. 9 If no other state has
jurisdiction or another state has deferred jurisdiction to this state, and
it is in the child's best interest, the court may obtain jurisdiction.
Except as noted, physical presence of the child is not necessary for
jurisdiction.
B. Procedure
A child custody proceeding is commenced by a parent filing a
petition for either legal separation, dissolution or custody of the child.
A nonparent may commence the action by filing a petition where the
child is a resident or where he is found if he is not in the physical
custody of one of his parents. A nonparent will be granted custody
only in extraordinary circumstances. Literal application of this clause
could result in numerous custody fights between the parents and a
person desiring custody. For example, a person could initiate a
custody proceeding when the parents of a child have left him with
his grandparents while they take a short vacation, because the child
is not in the physical custody of his parents. The courts must interpret
87 Id. at 199; KRS § 403.260.
The rationale for the 6 month period is explained in Ratner, Child Custody in
a Federal System, 62 MicH. L. REv. 795, 818 (1964):
Most American children are integrated into an American community after
being there 6 months; consequently this period of residence would seem
to provide a reasonable criterion for identifying the established home.88 An example of sufficient connection is where the wife returned to her
parents home where the child had spent several months every year. Willmore v.
Willmore, 143 N.W.2d 630 (Minn. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
89 See Application of Lange, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763 (App. Div. 1959). Here the
New York court modified a Swiss court decision where the mother had moved to
New York on the grounds that it had to intervene to protect the children's welfare
because each parent was taking them from the other without authorization.
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the nonparent's rights to preclude such a situation. Under the old
law a child would be given to one other than his parents only under
extreme circumstances.90
In all custody cases notice and an opportunity to be heard must be
given the child's parent or guardian. Other interested parties may be
permitted to intervene upon showing good cause.
C. Determining Custody
Child custody is to be determined in accordance with the child's
best interests. All relevant factors shall be considered including the
desires of the child and his parents, the total adjustment picture of
the child to those with whom he will be interacting, and the mental
and physical health of all involved. The law is essentially unchanged
in this area. Conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
his relationship with the child is not to be considered. 91 If the child
has no knowledge of the conduct, his relationship is presumably
unaffected by it; consequently, it is not admissible as evidence. Since
almost any misconduct of which the child has knowledge will affect
his relationship with his custodian, most activity of this type will
probably be admissible.
Several factors which a trial court may properly consider in de-
termining custody were enumerated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in Parker v. Parker.92 The Court of Appeals will not disturb the judg-
ment of the trial court as to which parent gets custody when the fol-
lowing relevant factors have been considered:
(1) Which of the parents shows the greater character and stability
that would make him or her the more suitable person to pre-
side over a home in which the children can adequately be
reared?
(2) All factors contributing to the breaking up of a home and mar-
riage.
(3) Which parent offers the more suitable home environment in
the future? Have either of them remarried? If so, what type of
person will the stepparent be?
(4) What are the desires of the children and what will least dis-
turb them in their lives?
(5) The availability of educational facilities.
(6) The health of all parties concerned, both physical and mental.
90 Horton v. Horton, 154 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1942).
91 KRS § 403.270. An example of conduct that probably should not be ad-
mitted is when one spouse has been carrying on an illicit sexual relationship during
the separation period. As long as the child did not know of this and the activity
did not affect the child, then it should not be admissible.
92 467 S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1971).
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(7) The possible financial arrangements. Whether the mother and
father both must work or their ability to work and produce
an income to support the family.
(8) The respective ages of the parents and in some cases other
relatives who must assist in the rearing of the children.93
Presumptions developed by case law are intended to remain valid
in determining who is to obtain custody.
Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by the case
law are mentioned here, the language of the section is consistent
with preserving such rules of thumb. The preference for the
mother as custodian of young children when all things are equal,
for example, is simply a shorthand method of expressing the best
interests of the child, and this section enjoins judges to decide
custody cases according to that general standard. 94
Some presumptions to be generally followed include preference for
the mother as custodian, parent over nonparent and the existing cus-
todian over a new one.
D. Temporary Custody
A party may move for temporary custody of the children during a
custody proceeding until a final judicial determination is made. The
best interests of the children is the primary consideration.
The manner in which temporary custody is obtained is embodied
in KRS §§ 403.280 and 403.350, which apply the same standards that
are used in determining permanent custody.95 A party to a custody
proceeding must accompany a motion for temporary custody with an
affidavit containing the facts supporting the requested order or
modification. Copies of the affidavit must be sent to the other parties
who may file counter affidavits. The affidavits must present sufficient
cause to overcome the presumption against adequate cause for a hear-
ing. If a hearing is held, the opposing parties must show cause why
the requested order or modification should not be granted. Temporary
custody may be determined solely on the basis of affidavits if there is
no objection. A temporary custody order is vacated when the proceed-
ing for dissolution or legal separation or for custody is dismissed.
Whether a hearing is necessary in all cases of temporary custody
is debatable. KRS § 403.350 read alone seems to indicate that a
motion for temporary custody cannot be granted without a hearing.
However, when read in conjunction with KRS § 403.290, which pro-
vides that temporary custody may be awarded solely on the basis of
03 Id. at 596.
94 UNirFom AcT § 402, Comment.
95 KRS § 403.270.
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the affidavits if there is no objection, and considering the child's best
interests and the practical realities of the burden imposed on the court
and the parties if a hearing is necessary, the realistic conclusion is
that a hearing is not required. Further, the comment to § 403 in the
Uniform Act states its purpose is to "encourage trial courts to issue
temporary custody orders without formal hearing whenever possible."
E. Interview with the Child
The trial court may interview the child in chambers to determine
his wishes as to custodian and visitation. This interview must be
transcribed and entered into the record, and the court may allow
counsel to be present at the interview. Written advice from pro-
fessional personnel may be obtained by the court, allowing counsel the
right to be informed of the advice and to examine the consultant.96
A private interview with the judge will afford the child the greatest
opportunity to express his true feelings without the spectre of his
parents to persuade him. The parents are protected from an un-
scrupulous judge by the requirement of recording the interview.
Professional advice seems to be encouraged and the court probably
has the power to assess the costs of the consultant to one or both of
the parties.97
F. Investigation by the Court
In contested custody proceedings, and in other custody proceedings
if a parent or custodian requests, the court may order an investigation
and report of custodial arrangements. The investigator may consult
anyone with pertinent information and can refer the child to profes-
sional personnel upon order of the court, although the child's permission
must be obtained if he is sixteen and mentally competent. The in-
vestigator's information must be made available to all parties, and the
report must be mailed to all parties ten days before trial. If these
requisites are met the report is admissible. All parties have a non-
waivable right to cross-examine the investigator and anyone he has
consulted.98
The "friend of the court" is referred to specifically as a possible
investigator and is authorized to make reports of this nature upon
request of the court.99 However, it is financially impossible for most
courts to investigate many of these cases in depth. The parties can
96 KRS § 403.290.
97 See KRS §§ 403.220 and 403.310.
98 KRS § 403.300.
99 KRS 403.090.
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probably be ordered to pay the costs involved in an investigation to
remove that burden from the court.100
G. Custody Hearing
In accordance with fostering the child's best interest, custody
proceedings have priority on the docket, and the court may tax as
costs the expenses of having any person it deems necessary at the
hearing. It is the judge's responsibility to decide all issues of law and
fact. The hearing may be closed, and, if necessary, the record sealed
if it is in the child's best interest.10 1 Essentially, the court has a very
broad range of power to be used at its discretion to protect the child's
welfare.
H. Visitation
The noncustodial spouse has a right to reasonable visitation unless
the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health would be
seriously endangered. Visitation rights can be denied only after a
hearing. An order pertaining to visitation rights may be modified by
the court only if the child's health is seriously endangered.102 Since,
according to this section, endangering the moral health of the child
is a ground for refusing visitation privileges, there is certain to be
testimony concerning misconduct at this stage of the proceedings,
another loophole through which evidence of fault is admissible.
I. Upbringing of the Child
The custodian has the right to determine the child's upbringing,
except as specifically limited by a written agreement between the
parties at the time of the custody decree. The custodian's authority
may be limited if, after a hearing upon motion of the noncustodial
parent, the child's health is endangered. 10 3 Preventing intrusions on
the custodial parent by the noncustodial parent and promoting family
privacy are the purposes of this provision. 10 4 Thus the noncustodial
parent has to establish a compelling case before the court will inter-
vene. The court is also empowered to order the local probation or
welfare department to continuously supervise the case to assure that
the custodial or visitation terms of the decree are carried out. 05
J. Modification of the Custody Decree
No motion to modify a custody decree will be entertained earlier
100 See KRS §§ 403.220 and 403.310.
101 KRS § 403.310.
102 KRS § 403.320.
103 KRS § 403.330.
104 UNwoam ACT § 407, Comment.
'O5 KRS § 403.340.
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than two years after its date, unless the court believes from affidavits
that the child's health is seriously endangered in his present environ-
ment. No court with proper jurisdiction can modify a prior custody
decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts of which the court issuing
the decree was not cognizant, that the child's or his custodian's cir-
cumstances have changed and a modification is necessary to serve the
best interests of the child. The custodian shall not be changed unless
he agrees to modification, allows the child to be integrated into the
petitioner's family or the child's health is seriously endangered in the
present environment and it is in his best interests to change. If the
petitioner's motion is found to be vexatious and constitutes harrassment,
attorney's fees and costs shall be assessed against him.108
Both a waiting period and the possibility of an assessment should
tend to eliminate vexatious motions. The act is designed to maximize
the finality of decrees to foster the child's best interest:
Most experts who have spoken to the problems of post-divorce
adjustment of children believe that insuring the decree's finality
is more important than determining which parent should be cus-
todian.107
III. CONCLUSION
What will be the effect of the new law on dissolution of marriages?
Certainly, if it substantially increases the number of divorces, as
some sources indicate, 08 the effect will be undesirable. One author
believes that "difficult" divorce laws are conducive to marital stability
and that "easy" laws are conducive to divorce.10 9 In contemporary
America the family serves an important function and the effects of a
marital breakdown are far reaching. In any industrialized, impersonal
and mobile society the family fulfills the basic human needs of being
loved and belonging, being respected by others, and the ultimate need
of achieving self-actualization." 0 Therefore, it is important to keep
families together.
106 KRS § 403.350.
1o7 UNFoaV Act § 409, Comment.
108 There was a large increase in divorce rates in England following liberaliza-
tion of their divorce laws. Mace, Family Life in Britain Since the First World War,
in ANNALS or THE AmERcAN ACADEmY OF PoLrrICAL AND SocrAL SCIENCE 179-80
(1950). Russia also had a large increase in divorce rates after divorce was made a
matter of mutual consent in 1917. DOROG- & ERVIN, GR oUNDs FOR DiVoRCE IN
EUROPEAN CouN'rus 26 (1955). See generally Brody, California's Divorce Re-
form: The Sociological Implications, 1 PACIIC L.J. 223 (1970).
109 Marwick, The Comparative Sociology of Divorce, in DrvoRcE, Soc yrx AND
THE LAw 87 (H. Finlay ed. 1969).
110 Benn, Marriage Breakdown and the Individual, in DiVoRcE, SoC= AYN
THE LAW 111, 113-14 (H. Finlay ed. 1969).
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Some believe that society will actually benefit by allowing mar-
riages that have deteriorated (to the point where the continuance
affects the spouse's mental health and well-being) to be terminated
in a civilized manner.:" One attorney writing on no-fault divorce
said: "It was not designed to make divorce easy, but rather to provide
a means of terminating marriages which have, in fact, so deteriorated
they cannot be preserved."" 2 After all, marriages die on their own,
unaffected by the procedure involved in obtaining a divorce.
There is considerable evidence that the new California "no-fault"
divorce law'1 3 has not resulted in a substantial increase in marital
dissolution." 4 Dissolution filings increased 8.8% in 1970 over the
previous year in Los Angeles County, where 35% of California's
population lives. The increase was about the same as other types of
filings. Dissolution petitions actually decreased by 5% in the first
six months of 1971. Conversely, conciliation proceedings in 1970 were
up 121/% over 1969, and 8% in 1971."r The trend, in Los Angeles
County at least, is that dissolution is decreasing and reconciliation is
increasing. If this trend continues the law will have a beneficial effect
on restoring marriages instead of destroying them.
A significant question pertains to the role and effectiveness of
conciliation conferences and the use of marriage counselors. Certainly
California's experience indicates that both are useful. Opinions differ
as to the effectiveness of court ordered counseling. Some assert that
it will be ineffective," 6 while others argue that it will be beneficial."17
Even if the counseling does not effect a reconciliation of the parties,
there are other socially beneficial results. As one counselor noted, the
marriage counselor's goal is the healthy stabilization of the marriage:
That means not just sticking together, but really having a more
mutually fulfilling relationship. That is the ideal goal, of course.
But even if the marriage is terminated on the basis that the couple
simply does not have the potential to achieve a good marriage,
counseling can help the couple accept the termination of their
marriage with a minimum amount of pain and distress."
8
11 Schoenlaub, No-Fault Divorce: A Practical Approach to the Problems of
Marital Failure, 27 J. Mo. B. 579 (1971).
112 Id. at 613.
113 CAL. Ctv. CODE. §§ 4000 et seq. (West 1970).
14 Hogoboom, The California Family Law Act of 1970: 18 Months Experience,
27 1. Mo. B. 584 (1971).
115 Id. at 588-89.
116 See, e.g., Harvey, Marriage Counselling: A Therapeutic Approach to
Marital Disorganization, in DrvoRcE, Socmrr AND TnE LAw 35 (H. Finlay ed.
1969).
"7 Interview with Dr. John Green in 45 FLA. B.J. 562 (1971).
11s Id. at 564.
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Another important counseling function is preparation of children for
the divorce and possible remarriage of their parents. Beyond this,
counseling can enable individuals to learn the nature of, and perhaps
overcome, the problems that led to the breakdown of the marriage. 119
In one study, 63% of the divorcees studied had some sort of personal
difficulties in the medium to high trauma areas.120 If the personal
problems can be alleviated, future relationships will have a better
chance of being successful.
Two significant problems in the use of trained marital counselors
are their scarcity and the expense involved. A counseling session costs
between $20.00 and $85.00.121 Normally, four to six sessions are re-
quired, 122 so the expense may be somewhere between $80.00 and
$210.00. For many, the cost is prohibitive.
In conclusion, the concept of "no-fault" dissolutions should have
a beneficial effect on the courts and on society. The new Kentucky
law, however, seems to contain so many possible avenues to admission
of evidence of marital misconduct, that the old fault system is not
effectively eliminated. Evidence of marital misconduct by either
spouse is almost certain to influence the court's decision in all areas.
Therefore, to implement the new act in satisfaction of the intent to
make it a "no-faule' law, the court should attempt to prevent any
evidence of misconduct.
Thomas W. Miller
119 Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, in DivoRcE A AFTER 215,
233-34 (P. Bohannon ed. 1970).
120 J. GOODE, AFTE DIvoRcE 186 (1956).
12 1 UNiroPm AcT § 409, Comment.
122 Id.
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